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Reluctant Pluralist
Moore on Negligence
Kenneth W. Simons*
I. Introduction
Is negligence blameworthy? Does it deserve moral sanction? Is it a proper basis of tort
liability? Of criminal punishment? If the answer is, “Only sometimes,” further ques-
tions remain: When? And why only then?
These perennial questions in moral, tort, and criminal law theory continue to pro-
voke debate. InMichaelMoore’s earlier writings, he addressed these issues thoughtfully
but not thoroughly. However, a recent article that he co-authoredwithHeidi Hurd pro-
vides a systematic analysis of different conceptions of negligence and of different
accounts of its moral and legal significance.1
The results of this new analysis are surprising. Reluctantly, Moore has become a plu-
ralist, acknowledging a range of types of negligence that are sometimes morally blame-
worthy and sometimes appropriately sanctioned by the law—even by the criminal law.
Moreover, he has also become (to use the technical term) squishy. Despite his usual
fondness for sharply defined categories and exhaustive subcategories, he has come to
acknowledge that the distinctions between negligence and recklessness, and between
negligence and faultless conduct, are often a matter of degree. Moore’s willingness to
question andmodify his earlier views is laudable, and not just because his current views
are much closer to my own.
This chapter first discussesMoore’s earlier forays into the topic, and then reviews his
recent co-authored article. It concludes with some ruminations about different dimen-
sions of negligence, and about the distinction between negligence and recklessness, that
deserve fuller attention than scholars have provided to date.
II. Earlier Writings
This section sets forth some key arguments that Moore presents in his earlier writings
about negligence, arguments that analyze negligence both as a form of wrongdoing and
as a category of culpability, and that are especially skeptical of negligence in the latter
guise. I also offer some criticisms of and questions about those arguments.
* Much of section III of this chapter is derived from KennethW. Simons, “When is Negligent Inadvert-
ence Culpable? Introduction to Symposium, Negligence in Criminal Law and Morality,” 5 Criminal Law &
Philosophy 97 (2011), DOI:10.1007/s11572-011-9116-y.
1 Moore andHurd, 2011d. This article is an expanded version of a book chapter,Moore andHurd, 2011e.
In his 1984 book, Law and Psychiatry,2 Moore makes some rather broad generaliza-
tions about negligence that are in need of refinement. Thus, he observes that negligence
is muchmore central to tort than to criminal law, because intention is central in the lat-
ter.3 This is an overstatement, in light of the widespread use of recklessness, negligence,
and even strict liability as elements of modern crimes. He also refers approvingly to
what he calls the “classical” definition of negligence as behavior that is suboptimal from
the perspective of cost–benefit analysis, under the test made famous by Judge Learned
Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.4 “Negligence, in short, is the failure to
make, or to make badly, a cost/benefit calculation about the desirability of an action.”5
This definition, alas, is also somewhat misleading. In actual jury instructions and tort
law opinions, the Hand formula is rarely invoked. To be sure, some appellate court
decisions do discuss that formula. However, it is not clear from those discussions what
the formula is meant to express—a wholly utilitarian metric, or instead a pluralistic
balancing test that is consistent with deontological principles.6
Moore further contends that negligence is intended as a culpability requirement, and
notmerely a criterion of justifiable or permissible conduct. Indeed,Moore explains, the
surprisingly anthropomorphic reasonable person test “makes explicit the connection of
negligence to culpability only implicit in Hand’s kind of formula.”7 The Hand formula
tells us what acts are permissible and impermissible; the reasonable person test gives us
a standard for judging whether the actor has culpably failed to satisfy the standard.
Or soMoore claims. Yet when he attempts to clarify the relationship betweenwrong-
doing and culpability in the context of negligence, Moore muddies the waters:
[T]he average reasonable person . . . embodies those qualities of character that we think
persons should possess, and those capacities of mind we think all persons do possess.
The average reasonable person is benevolently motivated—he counts all persons’
interests as equal to his own; he is thus neither unduly selfish nor unrealistically altru-
istic. . . . He is also capable of calculating what actions are likely to lead to what results
and even to assign relative probabilities to each. He is, in other words, a preeminent
practical reasoner, finding the morally and legally correct major premises (in terms of
costs and benefits) for his practical syllogisms, and forming the accurate means/end
beliefs (in terms of probabilities) for his minor premises.
“[The] failure to make the right cost/benefit calculation,” he further explains, makes
people culpable only if they have the capacity to reason in this way.8
Here we confront one of the most challenging difficulties in making sense of negli-
gence. Is it a kind of wrongdoing, consisting in posing unjustifiable risks to others and
thereby harming them? Or is it a category of culpability, describing actors who display
a modest rather than serious degree of fault in violating a primary prohibition? Or, as
Moore here suggests, is it a bit of both? Moore seems to assume that wrongdoing
2 Moore, 1984d. 3 Moore, 1984d, 81–3. 4 Moore, 1984d, 81. 5 Moore, 1984d, 82.
6 See KennethW. Simons, “Tort Negligence, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Tradeoffs: A Closer Look at the
Controversy,” 41 Loyola of Los Angeles LawReview 1171 (2008); KennethW. Simons, “TheHand Formula in
theDraft Restatement (Third) of Torts: Encompassing Fairness AsWell as Efficiency Values,” 54Vanderbilt
Law Review 901 (2001); RichardWright, “Hand, Posner, and theMyth of the ‘Hand Formula,’” 4 Theoretical
Inquiries inLaw145 (2003).
7 Moore, 1984d, 83. 8 Moore, 1984d, 83.
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depends on one (unspecified) type of cost–benefit analysis, while culpability depends
on capacities for benevolence, prediction, and calculation of probabilities. But this
bifurcated approach is problematic, for it is difficult to see howwrongdoing of the neg-
ligence variety can be identified without calculating probabilities and making predic-
tions (at least on the Hand formula account of negligence as wrongdoing), and without
providing a normative framework for judging the significance of various costs and ben-
efits. The relevant framework,Moore says, is “benevolence.” But the concept of benevo-
lence is itself equivocal. Does it refer to a utilitarian consideration of all the
consequences that one’s conduct is expected to produce for the interests of all affected
persons? Or does it refer to a character trait disposing an actor to care about others as
much as she cares about herself?
In a more recent and more extended discussion of negligence in his book on causa-
tion, Moore gives similarly ambiguous guidance on the characterization difficulty. He
explains tort negligence, again, in terms of a “calculus of risk,” and explores in some
detail the Learned Hand formula, suggesting a number of plausible ways in which the
formula should be extended:
Hand’s calculus of risk . . . requires one to weigh the total harms risked versus the total
benefits risked if a given precaution is not taken, considered for each level of each kind
of precautionary action possible, for all levels and kinds of activities inwhich the defen-
dant might be engaged. An action is negligent, on this holistic view, “if its disadvan-
tages exceed its advantages.”9
In defending this extendedHand formula,Moore appears to be analyzing negligence as
wrongdoing. He notes that the “reasonable person” test is frequently used in tort law,
but suggests that this test might not actually vary the content of the Hand formula.
Rather, the “reasonable person” standard is a potentially useful heuristic for fact-
finders trying to apply the Hand formula, and it also specifies the epistemic vantage
point fromwhich the actor’s compliance with the Hand formula should bemeasured.10
This discussion, while illuminating, again provokes questions about how negligence
is best characterized. The ex ante epistemic perspective seems to be a necessary part of
defining what risks are wrongful to take; its relevance is not limited to assessing the
degree of the actor’s culpability. As Moore notes, risks are always 1 or 0 ex post. More-
over, one factor that Moore (properly) would include as part of the “expanded” Hand
formula is information/calculation costs. These (secondary) costs of continuing to cal-
culate the (primary) costs and benefits that must be considered under the Hand for-
mula sometimes outweigh the benefits of securing greater optimization at the primary
level. Moore’s point is quite correct, but it reveals a problem: in identifying what an
actor should do or permissibly may do, according to the Hand formula criterion of
wrongdoing, we also need to examine what efforts an actor should make to determine
the facts relevant to whether he or she is negligent.
9 Moore, 2009d, 185 (citing Restatement (Third) of Torts, § 4, comment k).
10 At the same time, Moore does concede that the reasonable person formulation might actually support
“true divergence” from the Hand formula: it might permit a deontological deviation from the consequen-
tialist calculus, permitting actors to engage in some activities that are not permitted under the calculus and
obligating actors to refrain from some activities that are cost-justified under that calculus. Moore, 2009d,
180. This is a welcome concession.
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To be sure, the characterization difficulty is less pronounced (or is it simply less
transparent?) when negligence pertains only to one of several elements of a moral or
legal norm. If the primary norm is “Do not unjustifiably harmV,” and if D is accused of
negligently harming V, the characterization difficulty is grave. But if the primary norm
is “Do not have sexual contact with V unless V consents,” then it is natural to charac-
terize as a mere question of culpability the question whether the actor was “negligent”
as to the element of V’s non-consent. In parallel fashion, it is natural to characterize an
actor who is reckless as to non-consent as somewhat more culpable, and a knowing
actor as even more culpable.
And yet, even in this context, negligence might be characterized as a criterion of
wrongdoing, not as a degree of culpability. Here is how. Suppose A and V consensually
kiss on a first date. ThenA touches V’s genitals. V expresses objection, Awithdraws his/
her hand, and they resume kissing. Assume that V did not consent to themore intimate
touching. Has A acted impermissibly but non-culpably? Or has A acted permissibly?11
According to one view, the non-consensual touching of any part of V’s body is what
is impermissible. According to another, what is impermissible is acting in a way that
poses an unjustifiably high risk of a non-consensual touching in light of the other val-
ues at stake, where “unjustifiably” takes into account both the significance of those
other values (such as spontaneity in romantic encounters and the benefit of mutually
desired sexual intimacy), and the risks that those values will not be realized. On the sec-
ond view, we might conclude that A has not acted impermissibly. After all, one reason
for characterizing conduct as permissible (rather than impermissible but non-
culpable) is to provide action guidance. And we might conclude that actors seeking
physical intimacy should feel free to take very small risks that their conduct of mildly
escalating the level of intimacy will be mildly objectionable to the other actor.12
This characterization problem has implications for other issues in moral and legal
theory, especially for the question of how to analyze reasonable and unreasonable mis-
takes (about the elements of an offense, or about defenses). Suchmistakes are plausibly
viewed as just a subset of reasonable and unreasonable conduct (at least when the mis-
take plays, or should play, a role in the actor’s practical reasoning). So the question
becomes: if A makes a reasonable mistake in believing that V consents, has he non-
culpably committed a wrong, or has he not committed a wrong in the first instance? In
one important sense, I believe, he has not committed a wrong at all, for it is often
11 A third possibility is that A has acted both impermissibly and culpably. However, the example ismeant
to instantiate a “reasonable” escalation of intimacy in light of the current level of intimacy; the reader can
supply an even smaller escalation if this example is not persuasive. (The example is of sexual contact, not
sexual intercourse, because greater controversy attends the question whether and when it is culpable for an
actor to unilaterally escalate intimacy from sexual touching to sexual intercourse.)
12 Stephen Schulhofer, in arguing for an “only YES means YES” definition of consent in the context of
sexual intercourse, has emphasized the comparative error costs to the initiating party and the other party. If
affirmative consent by words or conduct is required, this does impose costs on the initiating party (includ-
ing the need to ask for more explicit consent, or to wait or forego intercourse), but those costs are out-
weighed, Schulhofer believes, by the costs to the other person of submitting to sexual intercourse that the
person finds objectionable. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Fail-
ure of Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). I agree that comparative error costs are rel-
evant to the analysis of permissible risks in sexual encounters, but I also believe that in some cases, such as
the example in the text, the ex ante quantitative and qualitative “costs” or burdens of not proceeding
outweigh the burdens of proceeding.
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socially desirable for actors to proceed upon reasonable appearances—for police to
arrest upon probable cause, for actors to use defensive force when this reasonably
appears necessary, and so forth.13
Moore’s other forays into the negligence jungle are mainly explorations of negli-
gence as culpability, not as wrongdoing. In the 1990 essay, “Choice, Character, and
Excuse,”14 slightly revised for publication as Chapter 13 in the book Placing Blame,15
Moore considers whether a choice or character conception of culpability is able to
explainmoral responsibility for negligence, and thus to justify criminal liability for neg-
ligence. His answer is no. The choice conception does not suffice, because although a
negligent actormakes choices, they are not of the right kind: the actor “does not choose
to do the kind of complex action forbidden bymorality and law (such as killing theman
standing behind the target) because his mind was not adverting to that aspect of his
action.”16Moore is basically correct here, thoughwemust be careful not to overstate the
extent to which even an advertent actor “chooses” to impose the risk to which he
adverts (as I note in this chapter’s Conclusion).
Moore believes that the character theorist is also unable to accommodate the culpa-
bility of negligence. First, an act of negligence can be isolated, and need not spring from
a general tendency to be inadvertent. Second, even a general tendency towards inad-
vertence andmistakes need not flow from a bad character, such as an indifference to the
interests protected by the criminal law. “Such carelessness can be due to awkwardness
and stupidity as easily as indifference. And, again, we blame for carelessness irrespec-
tive of why one is careless.”17 This analysis is largely persuasive, though I also believe
that some forms of indifference are a suitable basis for moral blame and criminal
liability, as I explore in the Conclusion.
In his original article, Moore concluded from this analysis that negligence might not
meritmoral blame, and that legal liability for negligence can only be justified onutilitar-
ian grounds.However, by the timeof the publicationof his 1997 book,PlacingBlame, he
had changed his view, now believing that “morally . . . it seems wrong to say that we are
not at least somewhat blameworthy fornegligent conduct.”18The third formof culpabil-
ity that negligence reflects is, according to Moore, H. L. A. Hart’s notion of the culpa-
bility of unexercised capacity. Still, Moore believes there is a basic difference between
that very modest form of culpability and the more robust form that occurs when an
actor knows he is doing a wrongful sort of action and nevertheless chooses to do it.
One important response toMoore’s argument here is that only a subset of negligence
cases are sufficiently morally blameworthy to be fit subjects of criminal punishment—
namely, those that reflect, not mere carelessness, but culpable indifference.19 Suppose
13 For further discussion of this argument, see KennethW. Simons, “Self-Defense: Reasonable Beliefs or
Reasonable Self-Control?,” 11 New Criminal. Law Review 51 (2008); R. A. Duff, “Rethinking Justifications,”
39 Tulsa Law Review 829 (2004); but see Heidi Hurd, “Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpabil-
ity,” 74 Notre Dame Law Review 1551 (1999), for a contrary view.
14 7 Social Philosophy. & Policy 29 (1990). 15 Moore, 1997b. 16 Moore, 1997b, 589.
17 Moore, 1997b, 590–1. 18 Moore, 1997b, 591.
19 For further discussion of this concept, and the promise and perils of employing it as a legal standard,
see KennethW. Simons, “Does Punishment for ‘Culpable Indifference’ Simply Punish for ‘Bad Character’?
Examining the Requisite Connection between Mens Rea and Actus Reus,” 6 Buffalo Criminal Law Review
219 (2002).
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Sam pays no attention whatsoever to whether Victoria consents to his sexual advances,
because he is entirely focused on his own pleasure. This reason for unawareness is,
under the circumstances, highly culpable, even if it does not flow from a general char-
acter flaw, and even though Sam does not choose to proceed with intercourse by con-
sciously disregarding a risk that Victoria does not consent. Now consider the following
passage from Moore, in which he is responding to Hart’s effort to
characterize the choice theory itself as an instance of a capacity theory:
What makes the intentional or reckless wrongdoer so culpable is not unexercised
capacity—although that is necessary—but the way such capacity to avoid evil goes
unexercised; such wrongdoers are not even trying to get it right. Their capacity goes
unexercised because that is what they choose.20
This argument proves too little, however. It is indeed persuasive as applied to Sam, an
actor who is “not even trying to get it right.” By contrast, one plausible negative crite-
rion of culpable indifference is good faith: an actor is not culpably indifferent if she is
“trying to get it right”—if she tries to conform tomoral and legal norms and her failure
to conform is due only to lack of skill or judgment.21 Moore is right to emphasize that
culpability depends on the way in which an actor fails to exercise his capacity to avoid
harm, and not merely on the fact that he has failed to exercise his capacity. But a culpa-
bly indifferent actor can be distinguished from a simply negligent actor in this respect,
because the fault of the former requires more than his mere failure to exercise a
capacity.22
III. Moore’s Current Views on the Culpability of Negligence
Moore’s most recent and most detailed analysis of the culpability of negligence is con-
tained in an article he co-authored with Heidi Hurd, “Blaming the Awkward, the Stu-
pid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence.” The article is a tour de
force, addressing and clarifying an enormous range of conceptual, moral, and legal
issues that are relevant to the judgment of whether negligence is an apt basis for moral
blame or for legal sanction.
20 Moore, 1997b, 590 (emphasis added).
21 See Simons, “Punishment for ‘Culpable Indifference.’”
22 In Chapter 9 of Placing Blame, “Prima FacieMoral Culpability,” originally published inMoore, 1995b,
Moore returns to the topic of negligence, and reiterates his view that its culpability cannot be compared to
the culpability of intentional or reckless conduct:
Culpably inadvertent risk-taking . . . involves a kind of epistemic failure. One who acts unreason-
ably is one who believes unreasonably in the sense that an inference about unjustified risk-taking
is not drawn when it should be. . . . Culpability as negligence blames us despite our acting rightly
in the world as we see it. Although we can be somewhat culpable in not seeing the world more
clearly, such culpability pales before that of wrongdoers who choose to do their wrongs in aworld
they see clearly.
Moore, 1997b, 412.
And he suggests that choice is the appropriate minimal culpability for a criminal law that seeks to achieve
retributive justice, while unexercised capacity is an appropriate culpability for a tort law that seeks to achieve
corrective justice; this explains why negligence is central in tort law but not criminal law.
As a crude generalization, this is a plausible analysis, though (as Moore recognizes) tort law contains sig-
nificant elements of strict liability, too. For example, tort law’s “reasonable person” test pays very little
attention to individual cognitive capacities.
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Moore and Hurd begin their wide-ranging article by clarifying that they understand
the concept ofnegligence as some formofunreasonable risk-taking.Theyprescind from
questions about what makes the risk-taking unreasonable. But, they add, they do not
presuppose that the balance of risks and benefits that the negligence inquiry often
requires is necessarily a utilitarian calculus, and they are open to a non-consequentialist
account.This is a verywelcomeevolution inMoore’s views.
The authors plausibly view criminal negligence as requiring a “gross” degree of
negligence, unlike tort negligence, which simply requires a departure from the standard
of reasonable care. They then distinguish recklessness from criminal negligence in two
respects.First, a recklessactormustbeadvertent,whileanegligentactorneednotbe.The
authorsalsoemphasize, correctly, thatwhileadvertence isnecessary for recklessness, it is
not sufficient: some instances of advertent negligence do not and should not count as
reckless. In my view (but apparently not theirs23), recklessness requires not just aware-
ness of a risk of harm, nomatter howminiscule, but awareness of a substantial or at least
non-trivial risk of harm.24 This threshold is, I believe, what the Model Penal Code
means to require, and also is a normatively appropriate criterion of recklessness, inso-
far as recklessness warrants more punishment than negligence (or warrants punish-
ment when negligence would be insufficient). If you decide to drive very safely to the
store rather thanwalk two blocks, you are imposing aminiscule additional risk of harm,
but even if you offer no justification for your choice, you should not be considered
reckless.25
Second, the authors assert that a reckless actor must be “grossly, grossly” negligent,
and not, as in the case of the criminally negligent actor, merely grossly negligent. I
disagree with this assertion as a descriptive matter; the law does not actually draw the
distinction in this manner.26 Moreover, it is highly doubtful that such a “gross, gross”
deviation requirement for reckless liability would be a sensible legal standard. As
applied, such a requirement would often make proof of recklessness unduly difficult. If
an actor subjectively believes there is only a small risk that the victim of his sexual
advances is not consenting, but fails to communicate with the victim to be sure that she
consents, a jury might plausibly find gross but not “gross, gross” negligence, yet the
conduct seems egregious enough to justify punishing for recklessness rather than
negligence.
Furthermore, such a requirement would place extraordinary demands on the judge
and, especially, the jury. It is challenging enough to explain the difference between
23 The authors at one point assert that an actor who believes the risk is small is not reckless because he
does not grossly, grossly depart from reasonable care. At another point, however, they say that awareness of
the substantiality of risk is not a requirement of recklessness.
24 See KennethW. Simons, “Should theModel Penal Code’s Mens Rea Provisions Be Amended?,” 1Ohio
State Journal of Criminal Law 179 (2003).
25 How that threshold (“substantial” or “non-trivial”) should be defined is, to be sure, a difficult question.
26 See Simons, “When is Negligent Inadvertence Culpable,” 111. To be sure, theModel Penal Code treats
reckless actors as categorically more culpable than negligent actors. But that is because they, unlike negli-
gent actors, knowingly endanger others, not because their acts of endangerment are necessarily a greater
deviation from reasonable care. Compare Delbert, who speeds through an intersection, knowingly creating
a 1 in 1,000 risk of injuring a pedestrian; with Elbert, a beginning driver who unknowingly creates a 1 in 3
risk of injuring another driver on the highway because he does not check his mirrors before changing lanes.
Given the level and type of risk that Delbert creates, he departs less from a standard of reasonable care than
Elbert. But the Code will treat Delbert as reckless and Elbert as negligent.
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ordinary civil negligence and “gross” criminal negligence. Explaining the difference
between “gross” and “gross, gross” negligence would be even more daunting. The
authors, unfortunately, offer little guidance on this score. They refer several times to
Judge Magruder’s distinction between being a “fool” (ordinary negligence) and a
“damned fool” (gross negligence), and they suggest that recklessness requires that one
be a “damned damned fool” or (inMagruder’s phrase) a “God-damned fool.” Lord help
us if this language finds its way into a jury instruction.27
Even if some negligence is advertent, the question remains: can criminal punish-
ment for inadvertent negligence be justified? The authors pay special attention to the
details of H. L. A. Hart’s affirmative answer. Hart claimed that we are culpable, not just
for our choices, but for our unexercised individual capacities. The authors pose several
challenging and central questions about this account. What does it mean to have the
capacity to advert to a risk? Do people actually have that capacity? And, finally, if they
do have such a capacity but fail to exercise it, are theymorally culpable in such away and
degree as to deserve criminal punishment?
In their thorough responses to these questions, the authors clarify a range of critical
conceptual and normative issues. Thus, they helpfully identify the many features of
“advertence” that require clarification, including the requisite object of the belief, the
requisite accuracy and specificity of the actor’s typing of the risk, the requisite vividness
of the phenomenological experience (if any is indeed required), and the relevance of
cognitive dissonance, wishful thinking, and self-deception. They observe, plausibly,
that many of these issues are questions of degree. They conclude, less persuasively, that
we can therefore throw many of these scalar questions into the hopper with other
aspects of the recklessness criterion: thus, they claim, an especially unjustifiable risk
might counterbalance an especially dim awareness so that we can still legitimately con-
sider the actor to be reckless. This is not a recipe for a determinate rule to guide actors
or legal decision-makers. And such a sliding-scale approach demands a deeper justifi-
cation. If recklessness is more culpable because it demonstrates a deliberate and imper-
missible trade-off—a definite choice to act in the face of a risk—then it seems that some
minimal threshold of awareness should be established, a threshold that “dim”would fall
short of.Moreover, the view that recklessness is just one point on a sliding scale that bal-
ances numerous culpability factors is problematic. Such a conception of culpability is
quite foreign to criminal law grading distinctions and seems inconsistent with
widespread intuitions.28
Turning to the question of themeaning of “capacity,” the authors point out that in the
present context, the contra-causal sense of capacity—whether the actor “could” have
done otherwise than he did in light of sufficient antecedent causes of his behavior—is
27 Moreover, the enormous trouble that courts have encountered making sense of “depraved heart” or
“extreme indifference” murder is a worrisome precedent. Indeed, if recklessness requires a “gross, gross”
departure from reasonable care, then presumably themore culpable state of mind of “extreme indifference”
would require an even more extreme departure. Should judges instruct the jury, in extreme indifference
murder cases, that they must find that the actor’s conduct was a “gross, gross, gross” departure from proper
behavior?
28 But see Larry Alexander and Kim Ferzan, Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). For criticism, see Kenneth W. Simons, “Book Review:
Retributivism Refined—Or Run Amok?,” 77 University of Chicago Law Review 551 (2010).
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not the relevant notion. And they correctly note that capacity statements are at least
implicitly conditional, translatable into “would (or could) have A’ed if C.” The capacity
question for negligent inadvertence, they claim, is whether the actor could have
adverted to a risk “if condition X,” where X is a plausible desert basis, just as the capacity
question for intentional and reckless wrongs is whether the actor could have acted
differently if he had chosen differently.29
So far, so good. But then the authors flatly assert: “[T]here can be no culpability of
unexercised capacity.” If negligent inadvertence is culpable, they argue, it is because
of the underlying source, X, of the incapacity, which directly grounds the culpability of
negligence. The “capacity to advert if X” judgment is “a mere implication of the inde-
pendent moral significance of X . . . et al. Until X is specified, judgments of unexercised
capacity lack sense; once it is specified, judgments of unexercised capacity have no
justificatory work left to do.”30
The authors seem to be claiming that the capacity judgment is irrelevant to culpabil-
ity. That claim is unconvincing. They are, of course, correct that the mere failure to
exercise a capacity to advert is not always culpable. Culpability requires something
more, such as (inmywords, not theirs) an “unreasonable” failure, or a failure to act with
the concern fairly to be expected of a member of the community.31 But the “something
more” does not by itself justify blame or punishment for inadvertent negligence.
Rather, only the combination of that extra something and the capacity to have adverted
(and to have acted differently) can justify negligence liability.32 A failure to advert can
onlymatter,morally or legally, if the actor ought to have adverted. And “ought” (the last
time I checked) implies “can”—here, a capacity to have adverted and then to have acted
differently. To be sure, we must examine the deeper explanations for that failure to
advert if we wish to offer a full account of negligence liability. But capacity to advert is
a crucial component of the analysis.
Addressing the possible culpable sources of inadvertence, the authors helpfully iden-
tify four categories, each of which is a distinct type of practical reasoning defect. These
are flaws inmotor control (e.g., clumsiness), in cognition (e.g., stupidity or short atten-
tion span), in conation (e.g., weakness of will), and in motivation (e.g., character flaws
such as selfishness or indifference). Of these, the most clearly blameworthy are the
motivational flaws, so the authors concentrate on these.
The authors raise a number of objections to premising criminal punishment for
inadvertent negligence on underlying vices such as jealousy, selfishness, or arrogance.
One is our inability to rank these vices in any reliable way. Sometimes, they claim,
29 The authors aptly criticize Alexander and Ferzan for conflating these inquiries. Alexander and Ferzan
seem to claim that we can advert to a risk only if we can choose to advert to the risk, yet actors only rarely
choose to advert to a risk. Moore and Hurd are right to respond that this begs the question of when adver-
tence is culpable, because the capacity to advert to risk might be subject to specifiable and defensible con-
ditions other than choice.
30 Moore and Hurd, 2011d, 164.
31 The authors appear to criticize Hart for asserting that culpability depends merely on unexercised
capacity, but this criticism is unfounded; Hart does recognize that the ultimate criterion of negligence con-
siders whether the failure to exercise that capacity is unreasonable.
32 Recall Hart’s point that certain gross incapacities—of children or the insane—negate responsibility,
even for negligence. H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008).
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inadvertence caused by jealousy is worse than inadvertence caused by selfishness, but
sometimes the contrary is true.
This objection is overstated.33 First, they give no concrete examples inwhich the rela-
tive “viciousness” of two vices such as jealousy and selfishness differs. Perhaps, in any
real-world example in which our relative evaluation of two vices seems to change, other
factors actually change and explain the apparently inconsistent evaluation.34 Second,
given the limited occasions onwhich criminal lawdoes, or at least should, impose liabil-
ity for negligent inadvertence, fine gradations between different vices need not be
made. Rather, we only need to be confident that the legal decision-maker is imposing
criminal liability on actors who have exceeded some appropriate threshold level of cul-
pability (whether due to jealousy or selfishness or indifference or some other culpable
trait) in light of other relevant features of his conduct (such as the degree of risk that he
is imposing and the extent of his awareness of the surrounding circumstances). Third,
the authors’ objection, if valid, would similarly doom our ability to employ recklessness
as a culpability criterion. Recklessness requires, in addition to advertence, a gross devia-
tion from a standard of reasonable or law-abiding conduct, in light of the “unjustifi-
ability” and “substantiality” of the risk. Yet the authors raise no similar objection to
recklessness liability.
Consider, by comparison, how negligence operates within the Model Penal Code’s
homicide structure. Negligent homicide is the least culpable category of homicide,
reckless manslaughter is the intermediate category, and murder (which requires pur-
pose, knowledge, or extreme indifference) is the most culpable category. Placing all
negligent homicide cases in the same grading category does not produce serious prob-
lems of inconsistency. The overall standard might be as specified in the Model Penal
Code (requiring gross deviation froma reasonable standard of care in light of the unjus-
tifiable and substantial risks), or it might also include more explicit language identify-
ing the relevance of culpable reasons for inadvertence, such as “inadvertent because of
a seriously culpable desire or emotion.”35 Though imprecise, these standards are no
more vague than “unjustifiable” in definitions of negligence and recklessness.
The authors express another worry: an analysis of negligence based on character or
motivational flaws cannot explain why wrongful action is required. “The theorist who
takes inadvertence to be blameworthy when and because it manifests poor character
33 The authors also worry about character theories insofar as one person’s vice might be another’s virtue.
Although this is a valid concern in some contexts in which the state is enforcing a particular view of virtue
and vice, here it has little purchase, because reasonable and significant disagreements only rarely occur with
respect to whether specific vices are relevant to conduct that creates serious risks of harm to others. “I was so
hungry that I took my eyes off the road for a few seconds to grab more fries”; most will agree that this is
blameworthy, even if, as a general matter, wemight be uncertain whether or to what extent gluttony is a vice
or is blameworthy.
34 For example, suppose A loses control of his car and injures passenger B because B had just informed A
that B is sleeping with someone A desperately wishes to date, while C loses control of his car and injures D
because C is selfishly preoccupied with combing his hair over his bald spot. A seems less culpable for losing
control than C, but not because jealousy is always a less culpable reason for posing a risk than selfishness;
rather, it is because reacting jealously and emotionally when suddenly confronted with evidence that
triggers that reaction is less culpable than choosing to groom oneself while driving.
I do agree with the authors that, in principle, it is possible that a moral factor that has a particular valence
in one situation has a different or even opposite valence in another. See Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without
Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004).
35 Simons, “Punishment for ‘Culpable Indifference.’”
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has to have an argument for why poor character is not itself sufficient for punishment if
it is confidently known.” This worry is misplaced. Yes, a supporter of negligence
liability does need an argument for an act requirement, but so does a supporter of
liability for reckless and intentional wrongs. Why not impose liability simply for har-
boring a reckless or intentional state of mind, even if it does not result in wrongful
action? Respect for autonomy, concern about excessive state power, and other values
explain why it is not justifiable to punish someone who has decided to kill but has taken
no steps yet to effectuate that desire. SupposeMichael gets out of bed, planning to go for
a drive, and he forgets that his car’s brakes are not in working order. If he has not left his
bedroom when apprehended by the ever-vigilant police, he, too, should be shielded
from criminal liability.36
The authors then raise a more fundamental concern: why, in a character theory, is
inadvertence required? “If inadvertence is blameworthy when and because it is the
product of unfortunate character, it would seem that inadvertence is morally irrel-
evant.”37 Again, however, this ignores the relevant context. Self-absorption, for
example, is sometimes but not always a vice or a culpable trait. We should be grateful
thatMatisse, Prokofiev, Coltrane, and Sontagwere self-absorbed. But an actor is indeed
culpable if, while driving in traffic, he is selfishly preoccupiedwith finding the best song
on his car radio for five seconds while he pays no attention to the risks he is creating.
When a particular character trait foreseeably increases the risk that the actor will be
unaware of serious risks of harm, one might be culpable for acting in accordance with
that trait under those circumstances. The authors, by eliminating the actor’s inadvert-
ence and risk-creation from their analysis of negligence culpability, ignore much of
what is morally salient in the situation.
After persuasively rejecting the “tracing” strategy,38 the authors turn towhat they call
“free-standing” instances of negligence; that is, those that do not derive from the four
categories of defects in practical reasoning. An example is a loving parent who forgets a
young child in a car, causing the child’s death by suffocation. They plausibly argue that
the parent’s mistake need not flow from a character flaw or a flaw in practical
reasoning. Yet many would blame her for negligence.
What could account for such blame? One possibility theymention, here and in other
“free-standing” negligence cases, is that the parent knowingly failed to obey a sensible
and well-known action-guiding rule. Perhaps it is that rule-violation that explains our
judgment of blame. The authors argue that we can indeed blame a parent for knowingly
violating the rule against leavingayoungchildunattended inacaror in thebath, and that
the culpability involved in such a rule-violation is, at least sometimes, a good enough
36 To be sure, we should take this worry more seriously when the actor has (albeit unknowingly) taken
substantial steps towards causing the relevant harm or wrong. If Michael is actually driving the car with bad
brakes, should he be guilty of attempted negligent homicide? This raises distinct concerns, however. Andwe
might address these concerns by limiting attempt liability to purposeful and knowing (and perhaps reck-
less) risk-creation, notwithstanding strong arguments in favor of attempt liability for actors who proceed to
the very last act of risk-creation, whether the actor was purposeful, knowing, reckless, or negligent.
37 Moore and Hurd, 2011d, 175.
38 In an illuminating analysis, the authors address the “tracing” strategy in some detail, explicating the
different senses in which inadvertence can arguably be traced to a prior culpable act, and advancing some
telling objections to each.
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substitute for the culpability of inadvertent negligence. Their argument for this
conclusion is complex andcogent, but in two respects problematic.
First, the authors claim that the rules in question cannot be understood as deonto-
logical prohibitions, because the rules are not categorical and are sometimes subject to
consequentialist overrides; thus, the rules must be interpreted as epistemic rules of
thumb that give useful guidance for conforming with cost–benefit consequentialist
principles. This claim is dubious in two ways. Deontological principles need not be cat-
egorical. And, even in the particular context of rules for permissible risks, the principles
justifying the proper trade-off of benefits and disadvantages of precautions against risk
need not be entirely consequentialist in structure and content (just as the defenses of
self-defense and necessity need not be consequentialist).39
Second, consider their qualified endorsement of what they aptly call the substitution
principle:
One can . . . use [an actor’s] deliberate rule violation as a ‘substitute’ for a finding that
she subjectively appreciated the risks that then materialized, for the one has a ‘close-
ness’ to the other that makes such a substitution morally inoffensive. Thus the actor
who knowingly violates the rule against pointing a gun at another almost knows that
he is risking that other; the parent who knowingly violates the rule against leaving the
child in the bathtub cannot claim inadvertence to the possibility of his death . . .40
The authors do not confront the far-reaching implications of employing a substitution
principle to “approximate” fault in this manner. An armed robber accidentally drops a
loaded gun that discharges and kills a confederate. Why doesn’t the robber’s knowing
violation of the rule against armed robbery “substitute” for the intent to kill otherwise
required for murder? Although I am sympathetic to a very narrow version of the prin-
ciple,41 it is surprising that the authors endorse it without much qualification.
In the end, however, the authors conclude that the intuition behind punishing the
parent of the child who suffocates cannot be explained by this rule-violation argument,
since there is no known safety rule that the parent violated. I amnot so sure. Perhaps she
violated a rule requiring parents of young children always to check the back seat of their
automobile before locking the car. On the other hand, such a rule is not widely known
and followed. And in other cases they mention, such as inadvertently leaving a pot on
the stove to boil over (resulting, say, in burns to a child), this is even more clearly true,
yet the actor clearly seems negligent. So the authors are indeed justified in concluding
that some negligent inadvertence cases in which the actor intuitively seems culpable
cannot easily be explained. (One partial solution that the authors do not fully explore is
the demand for a gross deviation from reasonable care for criminal negligence liability.
Some conduct that intuitively qualifies as negligent does not so clearly qualify as grossly
negligent; leaving the pot on the stove that boils over is an example.)
Despite the relentlessly skeptical tone of most of the paper, the authors conclude by
listing eight categories in which criminal liability for negligence is sometimes
39 SeeKennethW. Simons, “Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime,” 76 Boston University Law Review
273 (1996).
40 Moore and Hurd, 2011d, 191.
41 See Kenneth W. Simons, “Is Strict Criminal Liability in the Grading of Offences Consistent with
Retributive Desert?,” 32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 445 (2012).
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justifiable.42 They honestly admit that the eight types are a hodge-podge: “[N]egligence
is not a single continent with a unified nature. It is more like an archipelago of islands,
each with its own distinct nature.”43 This is quite a concession from two decidedly
orderly and systematic thinkers. I feel their pain. But I think they are quite right about
the pluralistic nature of negligence liability. Indeed, one could take the point much fur-
ther; other types of culpability, especially recklessness, but also knowledge and
purpose, are also plausibly viewed as pluralistic.44
IV. Conclusion
Negligence is indeed a surprisingly complex and pluralist concept. As suggested earlier,
it would be very fruitful for scholars to more fully explore two issues that it raises. First,
to what extent is negligence amatter of wrongdoing, and to what extent amatter of cul-
pability? How do these two understandings of negligence relate to one another?45
Second, the subcategory of negligence cases involving “culpable indifference”
deserves special attention. Culpable indifference is an unusually protean concept. Some
treat it essentially as a term of art for whatever forms of culpability our moral theory or
legal doctrine recognizes.46 So understood, it does not help in the task of determining
when negligence is sufficient for legal liability. But others treat it as a distinctive form or
type of culpability, distinguishable both from intentional wrongdoing and from acting
42 The eight categories are as follows:
(1) The actor possessed full awareness of the risk created by his conduct, but the imbalance of
detriment to benefit is not so great as to make his risk-taking reckless.
(2) The actor was less than fully aware of the risk created by his conduct: he possessed a dim
awareness, an inkling, or a mere suspicion that his conduct might create peril.
(3) The actor possessed a dispositional awareness of the risk created by his conduct, but had no
phenomenological awareness of that risk.
(4) The actor possessed either phenomenological or dispositional awareness of general types of
risk associated with his conduct, of which the risk taken by him on the particular occasion
was an instance (although he failed to see it as such).
(5) The actor’s inadvertence was caused by flaws in his character against which he took no pre-
cautions.
(6) The actor’s inadvertence was caused by physical or psychological defects that are not flaws of
character, but against which precautions could have been, but were not, taken.
(7) The actor adverted at some earlier time to risks that were created by later behavior.
(8) The actor may have deliberately violated a knownmini-maxim, the spirit of which is to pro-
tect against the risks his ensuing conduct created.
Moore and Hurd, 2011d, 192–4.
43 Moore and Hurd, 2011d, 192.
44 See Kenneth W. Simons, “Rethinking Mental States,” 72 Boston University Law Review 463 (1992);
Simons, “Punishment for ‘Culpable Indifference.’”
45 See KennethW. Simons, “Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law,” 3 Theoretical Inquir-
ies in Law 283 (2002) (distinguishing between the unreasonably risky conduct conception of negligence,
which might be understood as a wrongfulness conception, and cognitive negligence, which is a culpability
conception; and noting the function of negligence as a secondary legal norm parasitic on a primary legal
norm).
Moore incorrectly attributes to me the view that negligence is a conduct requirement, not a mental state
requirement. Moore, 1997b, 411. My actual view is that some conceptions of negligence emphasize unrea-
sonable conduct more than unreasonable beliefs or attitudes; but that even the unreasonable conduct con-
ception ordinarily employs the idea of epistemic risk. See Simons, “Rethinking Mental States”; Simons,
“Dimensions.”
46 This seems to be the view espoused in Alexander and Ferzan, Crime and Culpability.
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recklessly, that is, acting with knowledge of the risks or the other relevant features of
one’s conduct.47 A more careful analysis of the concept would facilitate analysis of
moral and criminal culpability generally, and negligence culpability in particular.
Let me conclude with some observations about the distinction between negligence
and recklessness. As Moore and Hurd recognize in their recent article, the contrast
between culpability for inadvertent negligence and culpability for recklessness is much
blurrier than usually supposed. There are many reasons for this. I will mention two.
First, characterizing the reckless actor as “choosing” to impose a risk is a form of rhe-
torical embellishment, because the characterization is usually inaccurate. Typically,
such an actor, although aware of a risk of harm, proceeds despite that risk, not because
of it. A reckless driver prefers speeding to slowing down and reducing the risks of injury
to others. A reckless rapist prefers his own immediate pleasure to pausing and ensuring
that he has the victim’s consent. On rare occasions, to be sure, such an actor affirma-
tively desires to endanger another, as when two actors dare each other to a drag race in
a busy parking lot rather than an empty one because they value the excitement of pos-
ing a risk to others, or when two actors play Russian roulette with a loaded gun. But
ordinarily, the risk to others is not the actor’s objective. Granted, every reckless actor
“chooses” (in a weak sense of the term) to endanger the other when he makes a choice
to act despite knowing that there is a risk to the other. However, this is also true of the
negligent actor: he “chooses” to endanger another in precisely this same (weak) sense
when hemakes a choice to proceedwith his conduct despite not paying sufficient atten-
tion to whether he is posing a risk to the other. The point is nicely illustrated by cases in
which the negligent actor chooses specifically not to pay attention to a risk. If, on a dare,
the actor decides to drive blindfolded for 100 yards at night on an apparently deserted
stretch of road, or if a sexually aggressive actor decides to close his or her eyes and pay
no attention to whether the victim consents, each actor has made a choice that may be
just as culpable as if he or she had been aware of a significant risk of causing harm.48 In
short, although the reckless actor is sometimes indeed more culpable than the negli-
gent actor, this is not because the first has “chosen” to endanger the other while the sec-
ond has not, in either the robust or the weak sense of choice.
Second, the conduct of a reckless actor is properly viewed as culpable (and often
more culpable than the conduct of a negligent actor) even though the reckless actor
almost never is aware of, much less consciously chooses, all of the morally and legally
relevant features of his act. Thus, most commentators agree that the actor need not be
aware of the illegality, or perhaps even the immorality, of his act, in order to deserve
blame and punishment; nor must he believe that the risk he is running is unjustifiable.
And conversely, the culpability of so-called “inadvertent” risk-creation depends in sig-
nificant part on both the conscious choices that the actor made and the actual beliefs
47 See, e.g., R. A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); Simons,
“Punishment for ‘Culpable Indifference.’”
48 Suppose the blindfolded actor believes there is only a one in amillion risk shewill cause injury, but also
realizes that the blindfold reduces her ability to perceive such a risk from 95% to zero. Compare a speeding
but not blindfolded actor who believes there is a one in 100,000 risk that her speeding will cause injury. It
would be plausible to treat the two actors as roughly equal in culpability. And clearly both actors “choose” in
a similar (weak) sense to endanger others. (Of course, in many actual scenarios with greater traffic or
population density, the blindfolded actor will actually be aware of a significant risk of injury.)
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that he embraced. A driver is culpable for taking his eyes of the road for several seconds
only if he is knowingly driving in traffic; a babysitter is culpable for not attending to the
baby only if she knows at the relevant time that she is the sole or primary caregiver; and
so forth. If the actor is so detached from reality that he possesses no beliefs whatsoever
about the circumstances that would put a reasonable person on notice of a risk, then he
cannot be culpably negligent.
These observations do not imply that the distinction between culpable inadvertence
and culpable advertence is meaningless or pointless. But they do suggest that the dis-
tinction is one of degree, not kind, and that it depends crucially on context. Accord-
ingly, future analysis of the culpability of negligencemight profitably focusmore on the
trees, and less on the forest.
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